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Abstract: Scientific realism holds that scientific representations are utterly objective.  They 
describe the way the world is, independent of any point of view.  In Scientific Representation, 
van Fraassen argues otherwise.  If science is to afford an understanding of nature, it must be 
grounded in evidence.  Since evidence is perspectival, science cannot vindicate its claims using 
only utterly objective representations.  For science to do its job, it must involve perspectival 
representations. I explicate this argument and show its power. 
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  Realism is probably our default metaphysical stance.  The most obvious explanation of 
the world's manifest resistance to the will is that the world consists of facts that are independent 
of the ways rational agents think or feel or act.  We quickly realize that wholesale realism won't 
do.  The fact that Mark is now drinking coffee and the fact that he hopes it won't rain are directly 
dependent on his thoughts, feelings, and/or actions.  The fact that bell-bottoms are in style 
depends on what people think and feel, even if not on what any particular person thinks or feels.  
The fact that that the Red Sox won the game and the fact that giving to charity is good depend on 
human institutions and practices.  Under pressure from such challenges, we retreat from our 
naive realist stance.  Not all truths, we concede, are made true by the mind-independent world.  
But, we tend to retreat reluctantly, ceding ground only when we must. 
    
  Scientific realism is where many hold the line.  Natural science is rigorous.  It does not 
use vague terms like 'game' or 'charity'; it does not depend on shifting standards, as stylishness 
does.   It takes the natural order as its subject matter – an order that for the most part is as it is 
regardless of human artifacts, practices, and institutions.  Even when natural science investigates 
human beings, it describes or represents them in the same neutral way it describes or represents 
any other organism.  Science discovers things about nature – things that were there all along, 
most of which would have been there if rational organisms had never evolved.  Natural science 
apparently is, in Bernard William's apt phrase, about what is there anyway (1978).   
 
  Moreover, science has been stunningly effective at providing an understanding of its 
topic.  No other approach even comes close.  It may seem reasonable then to think that science 
represents the way the world is, that at least in the ideal end of inquiry it will (would?) do so 
completely and without bias or distortion, and that current science approximates the ideal.  If so, 
scientific representations must be utterly objective.  That is, they must not depend essentially on 
users or potential users with distinctive interests and points of view.  The semantics of such 
representations then are independent of and logically prior to their pragmatics.   The term 'utterly objective' is mine. To block misinterpretations, I should offer an   
explication.  A representation is a putatively denoting symbol.  It conveys how things are or 
could be.  Among the familiar sorts of representation are verbal descriptions, mathematical 
equations, pictures, diagrams and maps.  Such symbols need not actually denote; their semantic 
kind is determined by their being the sort of symbol that could, if the world obliged, denote.  
'Phlogiston' is as much a denoting symbol as 'oxygen' is.  In one sense, any representation 
depends on users or potential users with distinctive interests and points of view.  Something 
would not be a representation unless it was used or could be used to represent, and it would not 
be a representation of a particular thing unless it was used or could be used to represent that very 
thing.  There would be no representation of a particular item if no one had interests that would be 
served by producing one.  The sentence 'Tibet is mountainous' would not represent the 
topography of a particular geographical region if speakers did not call a particular bit of land 
'Tibet' and did not call a particular sort of terrain 'mountainous'.  But the choice to correlate 
particular labels with particular referents is effectively arbitrary.  The very same information 
would have been conveyed by the sentence 'Murble is morbish' if 'Murble' had been the English 
word for Tibet and 'morbish' the English word for mountainous.  The user-independence required 
for utter objectivity is independence except for the making of such arbitrary choices.  The 
contention that scientific representations are utterly objective is a contention that beyond 
arbitrary choices, they exhibit no dependence on users or potential users. 
 
  The term 'scientific realism' encompasses a variety of positions with a common set of 
core commitments.  For the purposes of this paper, I shall take scientific realism to be committed 
to at least the following: (a) the entities that an ideal science, literally construed, quantifies over 
actually exist; (b) the laws of an ideal science are literally true and utterly objective; (c) the 
models in an ideal science represent their targets accurately, and without bias or distortion; and 
(d) mature sciences approximate the ideal.  Although the representations in a mature, but not 
ideal, science may not be exactly true, they too are utterly objective.  Conditions (a), (b), and (d) 
are drawn from Hilary Putnam (1978).  Condition (c) is added to accommodate both semantic 
views which take a theory to be a collection of models (van Fraassen, 1980), and syntactic views 
which take models to mediate between laws and the phenomena they pertain to (Morgan and 
Morrison, 1999).  The first three conditions are supposed to capture the idea that science 
represents the way the world is anyway.  The fourth condition is supposed to connect actual, 
contemporary science with the ideal.   
 
  As is well known, Bas van Fraassen rejects scientific realism.  In The Scientific Image 
(1980) he argues for constructive empiricism, a position that contends that science seeks not truth 
but empirical adequacy, where the standard of empirical adequacy is truth about observables.  
Part I of Scientific Representation (2008) contains a different challenge to scientific realism, one 
that contends that if scientific representations – models, equations, maps, graphs, etc. – are to 
perform their scientific functions, they cannot be utterly objective.  Nancy Cartwright (1983)  
makes similar arguments about particular scientific models.  Like van Fraassen, she regards this 
feature not as a defect in the models but as an insight into the sort of epistemic access they 
supply.  The argument I find in Scientific Representation runs deeper.  It is not just that this or 
that model, or models in this or that science are insusceptible of utter objectivity.  Rather, it is 
that in order to afford the sort of understanding of nature that it does, science cannot consist 
exclusively, or predominantly, of utterly objective representations.  Science as we know it must deploy perspectival representations.   
 
  The argument is not an argument against realism per se; it is an argument against 
interpretations that construe certain representational devices, as they are used in science, as 
utterly objective.  Since such devices are central to science, if utter objectivity of its 
representations required for realism, the argument is an argument against scientific realism.  The  
scientific realist might, of course, rescind the commitment to utter objectivity.  But to admit that 
scientific representations are inevitably perspectival would undercut the claim that (ideal) natural 
science discloses what is there anyway.  It would thereby significantly undercut the attractiveness 
of scientific realism.  The argument then is that science, as currently practiced, or foreseeably 
improved, is not the mirror of nature. 
 
  Two questions immediately arise: How could scientific representations be perspectival? 
And why must many of them be perspectival?  The burden of this paper is to sketch van 
Fraassen's answers these questions, and to show why his answers should make us reconsider our 





  Linear perspective is a miracle of Western art.  First described by Alberti (1972), it is a 
method for representing spacial depth on a flat surface.  Lines orthogonal to the picture plane 
converge at the vanishing point, and the depicted sizes of objects are proportional to their actual 
size and to their ostensible distance from the viewer.  The pictorial effectiveness of linear 
perspective in works like Raphael's School of Athens is obviously of great aesthetic interest.  Van 
Fraassen maintains that linear perspective should be of equally great interest to philosophy of 
science.  For with the development of projective geometry, it became possible to prove that 
properly drawn linear perspective representations are rigorous geometric projections.  Because 
cross-ratios are invariant across changes in orientation and origin, drawings in perspective 
convey objective information about constancies in the appearances items present from different 
points of view.  They are not utterly objective though, for they still depend on points of view.  
Perspective drawings are indexical: they represent how things look from here (for some value of 
'here'.)  But their indexicality does not make them subjective.  Cross-ratios are determinate 
matters of fact about projective relations, not mere matters of opinion.  Van Fraassen (2008, pp. 
64-66) concludes that a linear perspective drawing of an actual scene is a measurement, a 
mapping.  
 
  There are inherent limitations on what any single representation can represent.  Every 
representation is a product of selection.  The representer has to choose what to represent, what 
aspects of the represented item to capture in the representation, and what level of detail to 
represent.  Despite the fact that these are matters of choice, when it comes to scientific 
representations, it is possible to make mistakes.  Simpson's paradox arises because fine grained 
statistical regularities are obscured at a coarser grain.  Although the pattern of graduate 
admissions across the university at one point suggested that Berkeley discriminates against 
women, the admissions patterns of each graduate department indicated the contrary.  To settle the 
issue requires knowing which statistics to use (Cartwright, p. 37).  To use a coarse grained representation to answer questions that require a finer grain is to make a mistake, even if all the 
features displayed in the coarse grained representation actually obtain.      
 
    Because they depend on a specific origin and orientation, perspective drawings have 
further limitations.  From a given vantage point, one object may occlude another.  If the horse is 
behind the barn from the picture's point of view, then the picture's representing the barn 
precludes its representing the horse. Nor is this always a matter of big things occluding little 
ones.  If the mouse is close to the picture plane and the barn is far from it, the perspectival 
representation of the mouse may occlude the barn.  A representation is implicitly non-committal 
with respect to a property if it makes no commitment as to whether the represented object has 
that property.  A  stick figure is implicitly non-committal with respect to its subject's girth.  It 
simply does not go into the matter.  A representation is explicitly non-committal with respect to a 
given property if its representing the having of one feature precludes its taking a stand on the 
having or lacking of another.  A representation of a man wearing a hat is explicitly non-
committal with respect to whether he is bald, because representing him as hatted makes it 
impossible for the picture to commit itself on the question of his baldness.  To be sure, the horse, 
the girth, and the  hairline could be represented in a perspective drawing.  But to represent the 
horse requires removing the barn or changing the perspective.  To represent the girth requires a 
more rounded figure.  To be committal with respect to the man's baldness requires omitting the 
hat.   
 
  Indexicality, occlusion, and non-commitment do not either severally or jointly entail that 
there are things that cannot in principle be represented perspectivally.  They entail limitations on 
what a single perspectival representation can represent.  But because of these limitations, there 
cannot be a single, comprehensive perspectival representation that represents everything from a 
single point of view.  The 'God's eye view' cannot be a point of view.  
 
  The pictures painted by Renaissance artists are, of course, of (putatively) visible objects, 
and the space they (purport to) represent is (putatively) physical space.
2  These restrictions are 
philosophically incidental.  Early perspective drawings had only one vanishing point.  But it is 
straightforward to create works with multiple vanishing points.  Le Déjuner sur l'Herbe, for 
example, is in two-point perspective.  Thus the number of vanishing points is optional.  Features 
at higher levels of abstraction than size, shape, and distance can be represented perspectivally, if 
the requisite structural relations are preserved.  So the restriction to visible features is optional as 
well.  Nor need the space be physical.  A logical space is a multi-dimensional array of 
possibilities open to the items that occupy the space.  To locate an item in a logical space is to 
determine which of the possibilities defined by that space it realizes.  To represent an item in a 
logical space is to represent it as having a particular position in the array of possibilities the 
space marks out.  Representations in a logical space, like representations in a physical space, can 
be perspectival.  They can show how occupants of that space appear from a certain vantage 
point.   And they can do so with no loss of rigor.  For the remainder of the paper I will take the 
term 'perspectival' to refer to any representation that represents how things appear from a 
particular point of view.   
 
  With the restrictions to physical space and visible features lifted, it is evident that science 
could avail itself of perspectival representations.  It could generate and deploy a host of perspectival drawings, diagrams, scale models, and maps.  There is plenty of evidence that it 
does so.  Still, one might think, only overtly pictorial or diagrammatic representations – the 
picture of the harmonic oscillator, the diagram of the double helix, the tinker toy model of the 
protein – could be perspectival.  Many scientific representations are mathematical models – 
systems of equations.  It is, one might think, hard to imagine how any extrapolation from linear 
perspective could characterize to them.  This may suggest that the visual models that admit of a 
perspectival interpretation are mere heuristics.  They are visual aids that help us imagine the 
phenomena, but not essential elements of science.  The mathematical laws and models – the 
equations – are the true scientific representations, and they are utterly objective. 
 
  Things are not so simple.  Analytic geometry, provides the resources to interpret 
geometry algebraically.  Geometric truths are provably equivalent to algebraic ones.   
Contemporary Cartesian geometry demonstrates that equivalence goes both ways (van Fraassen, 
2008, p. 41).  Algebraic truths are mathematically equivalent to geometric ones.  In effect, if we 
define an appropriate space, pretty much everything we can characterize mathematically can be 
spatialized.  Indeed, we do not even need to do the reduction.  The equivalence shows that the 
equations themselves, whatever their ostensible form, are construable as spatial representations.  
To be sure, the space need not be three dimensional physical space.  All that is needed is that 
there is an n-dimensional space of alternatives which embeds the mathematical model.  Nor, of 
course, does this show that the spatialized representations are perspectival.  But the mere fact 
that they are presented as equations provides no reason construe mathematical models as non-
perspectival.  In principle then equations are as capable as pictures and diagrams of bearing a 
perspectival interpretation. 
 
  Recapitulation:  Although I have made some headway, it is important to emphasize how 
little I have done so far.  I have not shown that scientific representations must be perspectival, or 
even that any of them are perspectival.  All I have shown is that there is nothing in the nature of 
perspectival representation that precludes scientific representations' being perspectival.  If my 
argument so far is successful, it answers the question 'How could scientific representations be 
perspectival?'  It remains to answer the question 'Why must many of them be perspectival?'  It is 
to that question that I now turn.   
 
 
The View from Nowhere 
 
           Plainly,  not  all  pictorial  or  diagrammatic representations are perspectival, even in the 
extended sense in which I am using the term.  The Cartesian co-ordinate system provides a 
familiar and elegant framework for non-perspectival representations.  Cartesian representations 
have no vanishing points; parallel lines in every dimension remain parallel.  Although Cartesian 
representations locate represented objects by reference to an origin and a direction, the choice of 
origin and direction are arbitrary. 'The chosen frames of reference, the co-ordinate systems, are 
inessential to the geometry taken in and by  itself' (van Fraassen 2008, p. 69).  Such 
representations are not indexical.  One need not locate oneself in the space of the representation 
to understand what and how it represents.  The representational powers of Cartesian systems are 
not limited by occlusion or explicit non-commitment.  Rousseau's picture of a tiger 'is explicitly 
non-committal about the [number of the] tiger's stripes, because it represents the tiger as obscured by leaves, and this precludes it from representing all the tiger's stripes' (Lopes, 1996, 
118-119).  A Cartesian representation, though it would not look like a tiger, could easily 
circumvent the difficulty.  Let the x-axis represent stripes, and the y-axis represent leaves in the 
environment.  The only available positions are integer values along either axis.  Then where a 
stripe is not obscured by leaves, y=0; where it is overlapped by leaves y>0, with the value of y 
indicating the number of leaves overlapping a particular stripe.  Where there are leaves but no 
stripes, x=0.  Such a graph indicates the overlap of stripes by leaves, but nothing is occluded.  It 
is expressly committed to the number of stripes on the tiger, regardless of their relation to leaves. 
 
  Why shouldn't we think of the logical spaces of scientific representations as Cartesian 
spaces?  Then, aside from the few scientific representations that are expressly perspectival, we 
could construe scientific representations as utterly objective.  The mathematical models could be 
spatialized – we could represent them in a Cartesian co-ordinate system – but the results would 
still be utterly objective.  There would be no reason to deny that they represent the way the world 
is anyway. 
 
  It is undeniable that science can generate Cartesian representations.  It is undeniable that 
such representations as likely to be accurate and adequate to their subject matters as any other 
representations we might produce.  So we have every reason to consider them utterly objective.  
In the limit, if not now, they will embody perspectiveless information about the way the world is 
anyway.  The fact that science could generate perspectival representations, and could interpret  
extant representations perspectivally gives us no reason to think that it does or that it should. 
 
  This is so, if science's function is merely to mirror nature.  The claims of ideal science 
could bear an interpretation under which they reveal how things are anyway.  But, van Fraassen 
argues, such a construal does not do justice to science, for accuracy and adequacy to the subject 
matter are not enough.                   
 
 
The View from Somewhere 
 
  Science is not something that just happens to us, it is something we do.  To do it, we need 
to use scientific representations.  'Use' is a pragmatic matter; and to make use of anything a 
subject needs to properly locate herself with respect to it.  This is evident in the relation between 
science and technology.  To develop an alloy that resists metal fatigue, a metallurgist has to be 
able to recognize signs of metal fatigue.  To do that she must adopt a perspective from which she 
can discern metal fatigue if it is present.  This will not, of course, be a matter of merely looking 
at distressed samples.  It will involve measurements, many of them made with technologically 
complex measuring devices.  These put her in a position to say, 'This is how metal fatigue (or its 
absence) looks from here'.  Assuming she is scrupulous, she will  run a series of tests which yield 
different perspectives on the phenomena.  She will check one appearance against another, 
drawing her conclusion from what she observes from a variety of points of view.  She does not, 
because she cannot, solve her problem using the view from nowhere.  For she has to know how 
metal fatigue is manifested. 
 
  This point must be conceded but, one might snobbishly sneer, that's just a point about technology, not about pure science.  It is to be expected that when we put something to use we 
need to adopt a perspective.  But, to continue the sneer, science is not technology.  Pure science 
may be utterly objective even though technological applications cannot be. 
 
  Van Fraassen points out, however, scientific results are established by testing and 
experimentation, and they are in principle always open to further testing.  Testing is as indexical 
and perspectival as technological applications.  If one wants to ascertain whether semi-
conductors operate in a magnetic field, one must run a series of experiments and take 
measurements.  To design the proper experiments and take the proper measurements, one must 
adopt a perspective on the phenomena – one must figure out how the phenomena would present 
themselves under various circumstances, how they would look from various points of view.   
Indeed, the distinction between testing and technology is spurious, since the testing devices are 
products of technology, and every technological application is in principle a test.  Even as simple 
a measuring device as a tape measure owes its status to considered judgments about the 
appearances things present – e.g., that the items a tape measure measures are not affected by the 
fact that they are being measured, hence that something that measures 32 cm is a reliable 
indication that it is 32 cm. 
 
  Van Fraassen's argument then is this:  science affords epistemic access to nature.  That 
access is achieved through experimentation and measurement.  The only way for an observer  to 
perform the experiments or make the measurements is to locate herself in the logical space of the 
phenomena, so her stance is indexical.  She has to think, 'If m is going on, these are the 
appearances it will present under these test conditions.'  That is, if m is going on, this is how it 
will look from here.  This locates the observer in the logical space she is evaluating, it affords a  
perspective on how things should look from here (for some value of 'here').   
 
  Although one could take the representations produced by science as utterly objective,  
doing so would divorce them from the empirical methods that generate and confirm them.  In 
that case, however, science would provide no reason to believe or accept them.  To interpret the 
repesentations as utterly objective is to cease to consider them scientific.  For science to do its 
epistemic job, it requires measurement.  Measurement is always indexical and perspectival.   





  To be testable, science must use representations that are perspectival.  Those 
representations are objective in that they contain information that is invariant across 
representations of the same object.  They are testable in that multiple representations of the same 
objects from the same perspective yield equivalent information, and in that that information can 
be accessed from multiple perspectives.  But they cannot plausibly be construed as embodying 
the view from nowhere or the way the world is anyway. They are not utterly objective. 
 
  The argument I have sketched does not discredit realism as such.  One could still endorse 
realism on purely metaphysical grounds.  Indeed, one could even endorse realism about the 
contents of scientific theories on metaphysical grounds.  The argument only shows that science – the enterprise that scientists engage in – cannot underwrite such an endorsement.  Nor does the 
argument favor constructive empiricism over other non-realist construals of science.  It is, for 
example, equally congenial to a constructivism that considers unobservables like electrons and 
quarks as real as observables like birds and bees, and that considers a theory that quantifies over 
electrons and quarks to be as committed to their existence as a theory that quantifies over birds 
and bees is committed to theirs.  So plenty of problems in the philosophy of science remain to be 
solved.  
 
  The argument underscores something that may be, but should not be, surprising.  Science 
is a human achievement – a product of human endeavor.  As such, it is ineluctably connected to 
the ways we access the world.  Science is one of the humanities. 
                                                 
1  I would like to thank James Tappenden, Mary Kate McGowan, Catherine Wearing and Bas van Fraassen for 
useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
2  I say 'purportedly' and 'putatively' because some of the pictures have religious subjects.  I am not remotely 
qualified to say whether heaven, if it exists, is three dimensional, or whether angels, if they exist are visible.  But 
it is plain that the artists represented heaven as a three dimensional physical space, and angels as visible entities 
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